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COMPETITION POLICY AND THE
STIMULATION OF INNOVATION: TRIPS
AND THE INTERFACE BETWEEN
COMPETITION AND PATENT
PROTECTION IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
Shanker A. Singham*
I. INTRODUCTION
The expiration of the January 2000 deadline that has
exempted many developing countries from creating legislation
to enact a regime more friendly to intellectual property rights
("IPRs") under the TRIPS Agreement, calls for a renewal of
emphasis on patent protection in the developing world; specifi-
cally on its effects to the pharmaceutical industry.' The funda-
mental question that faces the pharmaceutical world today is
how best to provide drugs to the general population and how to
do so cheaply. The ability of drug manufacturers in the devel-
oped world to cure diseases and create increased global social
welfare is under attack by the effects of weak intellectual prop-
erty regimes in some developing world countries. When eco-
nomic agents free ride on the intellectual innovation of other
economic agents, irrespective of legality, the owners of the
intellectual property refer to the free riders as "pirates" or
"copycats."2 As this article will show, the ability of so-called
copycat firms to thrive in a system of little or no patent protec-
tion causes significant net social loss. Only a strong intellectu-
* Of Counsel, Steel, Hector and Davis LLP. The author specializes in inter-
national trade law and policy and is licensed in the U.S. and all the member
states of the EU. The author gratefully acknowledges the able assistance of Danny
Sokol, Summer Associate, Steel, Hector and Davis LLP.
1. Even though the TRIPS Agreement improved the level of patent protection
in many countries, it is an imperfect system based on a compromise between the
developing and developed worlds. As this paper will show, the developing world, in
diluting the TRIPS Agreement, acted against their own long term best interest.
2. WOLFGANG E. SIEBECK, STRENGTHENING PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 77 (Robert E.
Everson et al. eds., 1990).
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al property system can best serve the needs of people around
the world. Such a system would promote greater competition
because it would allow market forces to set prices and, as part
of a larger competition policy, would create a better functioning
system with significant social economic gains. Though a num-
ber of articles have described the TRIPS Agreement and out-
lined some of its more salient features, few of them have
looked at the implication of the TRIPS Agreement upon devel-
oping countries. Even fewer have cited any of the empirical
data gathered by economists and applied it to their theoretical
arguments. This article seeks to use existing empirical re-
search to prove how a strong patent protection regime has a
net global social gain, as well as a net social gain to developing
countries.
As many developing countries embrace competition policies
and enact competition laws, the patent system itself has come
under attack. Many countries may seek to use competition law
to attack what they see as an unfair patent monopoly. This
article asks whether the patent is indeed a monopoly right as
defined by competition policy, and what attitude competition
policy should have towards innovation-enhancing patents. The
article asks how effective some antitrust remedies, such as
compulsory licensing, are likely to be in the case of pharmaceu-
tical patents, and further considers other issues which lie on
the intellectual property/antitrust nexus. Finally, the article
offers some recommendations to improve the system, but which
do not damage the patent system (which the author recognizes
as the key for spurring innovation and global economic
growth).
The need to protect innovation and to incentivize techno-
logical development is not a new one. Aristotle wrote about
such protection in The Politics.3 Though ideas on the protec-
tion of intellectual property stem from ancient times, govern-
ment protection of intellectual property has been traced back
to the early Italian Renaissance, particularly to 13th century
Venice, where patents were given for particular types of
glassmaking. Patents were used primarily as tools for technol-
ogy transfer until the 18th century, at which point patents
3. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, Book II, at 72 (C. Lord trans., University of
Chicago Press 1984).
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became engines of innovation in Europe and the American
colonies.4 The right to patent was viewed with such impor-
tance that the only time the word "right" is mentioned in the
U.S. Constitution is in this context. Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution states, "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In-
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."5 The economic theory behind patent protection
echoes the belief of the founders for the protection of this right.
Patents provide important public goods.6 Goods that result
from patents can be consumed by multiple economic actors, at
a very low marginal cost, because the cost of replication of the
creation of an invention is significantly smaller than the cost of
invention of a new product. A patent introduces a static distor-
tion in the form of knowledge being sold at above its marginal
cost. This distortion, however, is a necessary way to foster the
dynamic benefits associated with innovation.7 If pricing were
to occur at the marginal cost to maximize consumer welfare,
there would be a chilling effect on innovation since the incen-
tives to create would be diminished by economic actors who
would free ride on the efforts of others given that the marginal
cost of reproducing the innovation is far below that of the aver-
age total cost. As Frank Easterbrook notes, "Curtail the top
returns, and the whole structure of rewards changes for the
worse."' Therefore, by granting temporary exclusive rights to
new inventions, patent law allows the inventor to recoup the
cost of investment for the innovation.
One way to understand the patent system is through an
analogy to the mineral rights claims of the nineteenth century
American West.' During this period, the U.S. government had
two competing objectives: to retain government ownership of
4. See SIEBECK, supra note 2.
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8.
6. See Kenneth W. Dam, Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. STUD.
247 (1994).
7. Seminal work in this area was conducted by Kenneth Arrow. See generally
Kenneth W. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTVTIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS, NBER (1962).
8. Frank Easterbrook, Technological Innovation and Tradition: Enduring Prin-
ciples for Changing Times, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103, 106 (1999).
9. See Edmund Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L.
& ECON. 265 (1977).
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public land, and to make it possible for private firms to find
and extract minerals contained in that land."0 In the mineral
claim system, priority was given to those who were the first to
discover, stake and file a claim. The claimant had the exclusive
right to mine a particular piece of land. As in the patent sys-
tem, the mineral claim system required claimants to strictly
limit their claims both in what they sought and how it differed
from the public domain. One of the functions of the mineral
claim system was to create incentives for the prospectors (in-
ventors) to search for minerals (innovations). If the risk in re-
search and development is high, then the reward for discovery
must compensate for the high level of risk. In the mineral case,
it is easy to see the potential for output-increasing effects (as
opposed to output restriction). It is the same with the patent
system.
A patent increases the efficiency with which investment in
innovation can be managed. The patent owner is incentivised
to coordinate the search for technological and market enhance-
ment of the patent's value which allows information to be ex-
changed among searchers and ensures that duplicative invest-
ments are not made. It facilitates the channeling of develop-
ment into the most efficient invention for achieving a goal. ("A"
can also coordinate work on the production of product, "P"
avoiding wasteful expenditure on product, "Q," which is a sub-
stitute for "P," which must be independently invented and
developed). These efficiency-creating, output-expanding aspects
of the patent system counteract part or all of the output-re-
stricting consequences of creating an exclusive property right.
The patent owner also has an incentive to make investments
to maximize the value of the patent, without fear that this
effort will lead to unpatentable information; which may be
directly appropriated by competitors. Incentivization is needed
to achieve a more efficient allocation of incentives. Strong
patent rights reduce the risk to investors to create new pro-
jects. As one economist suggests, "In this context, patents can
be understood as a second-best solution to the problems creat-
ed by the public-good characteristics of knowledge. In theory,
the term of patent protection could be set such that it would
stimulate the development of new products and production
10. See id.
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processes at a socially optimal rate . . . ."" Thus, a lack of
patent protection leads to sub-optimal behavior. Some take a
particularly stark view of the deleterious effect of patent copy-
ing. Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Richard Fisher has
stated that, "The result of [copying] would be the erosion of
America's comparative advantage in high technology; and ulti-
mately loss of the benefits of new advances in health, public
safety, education, defense and freedom of information for the
entire world."12 Fisher likens intellectual property to a ware-
house of ideas and the unauthorized copying of such patents as
analogous to theft of goods from a warehouse.
Another effect of the patent right is its promotion of inno-
vation both within the same field, because advances from inno-
vation can be extended, and to other areas in which innovators
can apply for patents of their own, thereby "inventing around"
the patent. Moreover, because of patent rights, inventors have
an incentive to disclose knowledge to the public that they
might otherwise try to keep secret. This dissemination of infor-
mation has the effect of accelerating the research and develop-
ment ("R&D") of others. As information from patents is dis-
closed in patent applications, information about new technolo-
gies becomes more readily available to other inventors as an
input into their own R&D.
One can increase the efficiency of the production of new
drugs through a patent system because a patent right allows
for contracting between two firms. The innovative firm can
sub-contract parts of the development and manufacturing work
to other firms at a lower cost if its right to its innovation is
protected." As one study notes, the movement of knowledge
through the contracting for the transfer of information associ-
ated with innovations plays an important role for developing
country firms.'4 Moreover, the opportunity to compete in the
11. See Carlos Primo Braga et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development, 412 WORLD BANK DISCUSSION PAPER 40 (March 2000).
12. Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How Do We Protect American
Ingenuity?: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and
Trade, 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Hon. Richard Fisher, Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative).
13. See Jean 0. Lanjouw and lain Cockburn, Do Patents Matter?: Empirical
Evidence After GATT, 7495 NAT'L. BUREAU OF ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER 5 (Jan-
uary 2000).
14. See Ashish Arora, Contracting for Tacit Knowledge: The Provision of Tech-
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market with a strong patent regime remains. Just because one
company has produced a cancer treatment medication does not
mean that other companies cannot create better cancer fight-
ing medications. Stated differently, therapeutic alternatives
create pressure to keep the price of patented drugs down. The
year after Recombinate was released to treat hemophilia,
Kogenate was introduced onto the market to treat the same
symptoms. Similarly, in the case of Invirase, a protease inhibi-
tor for AIDS/HIV, Norvir was introduced just three months
later. 5 Thus, the possibility that patent holders would use
their exclusive right to engage in monopolistic practices is
limited, because the patent holder does not in fact possess
power over price. One writer points to the fact that statistical
studies prove that in the overwhelming number of patents,
there is very little monopoly power. 6 Competition laws that
prevent predatory pricing and other monopolistic practices also
serve to keep any monopolistic impulse by patent holders in
check.
II. IS THE PATENT A MONOPOLY RIGHT OR A PROPERTY RIGHT?
The patent system is designed to strike a balance between
granting a complete and absolute monopoly to an inventor for
a particular innovation (which would discourage other inven-
tors to engage in further research within the field covered by
the monopoly), and giving the inventor exclusive rights for so
short a period of time that they could not possibly recoup their
initial investment serving as a disincentive for invention. It is
important to point out that, from an economics perspective, it
is difficult if not impossible to make a judgement as to where
the balance is properly drawn. Anything done is at best merely
an estimate. It is true that it is possible for patent protection
to overcompensate inventors. The size of the monopoly profit
has more to do with elasticity of demand and marginal cost of
production than it does with amounts invested in research and
development. However, it remains the best method that we
nical Services in Technology Licensing Contracts, J. OF DEV. ECON. (1996).
15. See Claude E. Barfield & Mark A. Groomberg, Parallel Trade in the Phar-
maceutical Industry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare and Health
Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 203 (1999).
16. See F.M. Scherer, The Value of Patents and Other Legally Protected Com-
mercial Rights: Panel Discussion, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 535, 547 (1985).
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currently know of for incentivising research and development.
The benefit of the exclusive right is that it allows a limited
free market to operate for the licensing of the right, and it
avoids having a government institution or a court decide what
the royalty rate should be; thereby creating this "second best"
solution. In this context, it is important to draw a distinction
between the monopoly right in the product, which is itself the
subject of the patent right, and a monopoly in the treatment of
a particular disease in the case of pharmaceutical product
patents. In the case of patent protection for a particular phar-
maceutical product, there is no monopoly conferred for the
treatment which that drug is intended to provide, as a substi-
tute could be found which does not operate in the same way
that the patented product operates in treating the same dis-
ease.
Whether the patent is regarded as a monopoly right or a
property right will determine its role in the context of competi-
tion policy. It is a fundamental question, and one that too often
has been glossed over. And like all antitrust analysis, the
starting point is to determine the size of the relevant market.
In the case of drugs, or more accurately treatments, the key
question is, "What is the product market?" Is it, for example,
all drugs that treat a particular disease? Or is it one particular
drug for the treatment of that disease which is protected by
patent? Patents protect particular drugs or processes, not the
treatment itself. Hence, if the relevant market is the drug
itself, then the patent cannot confer monopoly power in the
antitrust sense because it does not confer power over price.
The price of the drug may be lowered by other therapeutic
substitutes.17 Zantac and Tagamet are both patented
pharmaceuticals that can be substituted for each other for the
treatment of ulcers. Because of substitutes, the price of ulcer
medication is lower than it would be if there was only one such
drug for ulcers. Only in such cases where there are no substi-
tutes can the potential power over price be found.'" Even so,
the calculation is identical to the first fact pattern. In neither
case does the monopoly itself give the patentee power over
price.
17. See Lanjouw, supra note 13, at 10.
18. See id.
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The question posed above is answered in antitrust analysis
by posing a further question. We assume the smallest possible
market - that of only one patented drug - and ask would, if the
price of that drug increased, consumers shift to cheaper substi-
tutes. The answer is of course yes, as long as such substitutes
exist. In other words, the relevant product market only will be
the single patented drug where no other products are substitut-
able. So, the monopoly issue is only relevant when there is
only one treatment for a particular disease. Indeed, not only
are there different chemical entities which can treat a disease,
these different chemical entities actually can be delivered by
different brands, and the prescribing doctor has a choice of
chemical entities and brands (such as in the case where there
is a patented brand and a series of generics). The choices possi-
ble equals the number of chemical entities multiplied by the
number of brands, which rapidly becomes a large array of
possibilities. Each of these permutations offers competition to
the patented product, and the possibility of independently
reducing its price through competition. To put it simply, the
presence of other available or potentially available substitutes
is a price discipline on the behavior of the patentee. The great-
er the cross-elasticity of demand, the greater the effect of price
substitution. However, studies suggest that this is not a con-
stant. In some cases, a smaller number of brands may
sometimes lead to a smaller price increase in a post-patent
world, where the cross-elasticity of substitution between chem-
ical entities actually exceeds the overall cross-elasticity of de-
mand. Hence, stronger therapeutic competition does not nec-
essarily lessen the profit-maximizing potential of patentees.
Frequently, as patent protection raises price, as is so under
more intense therapeutic competition, all of the competitors
increase price too, weakening the disciplining effect of competi-
tion. The key criterion appears to be the number and weight of
off-patent chemical entities. If this is high, then a high degree
of therapeutic competition will lead to lower profits (and hence
prices). On the other hand, where elasticity is low, greater
competition will have less of an effect on profits and price. In
this context it should be borne in mind that elasticity will
increase the less developed a country actually is, as price fac-
tors will become more important to a poorer population. Hence,
the disciplining effect on pharmaceutical profits is actually
greatest in countries with the poorest people. It is also impor-
370 [Vol. =XV:2
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tant to note that in antitrust, market power alone is not
enough to violate antitrust laws. It is only when a company
with market power uses its power unreasonably with respect
to its patent right that antitrust laws may be triggered; such
as when a merger in a field risks harm to competing new goods
and services.
In its Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual
Property (promulgated by the DOJ and FTC in April 1995),"9
the agencies determine that intellectual property does not
necessarily create market power in the antitrust context. The
Guidelines make the point that although the patent right may
confer the power to exclude with respect to a specific product
or process, there will often be sufficient actual or potential
close substitutes for such products, processes, or works to pre-
vent the exercise of market power."
Defining the market is critical in evaluating whether pat-
entees actually have market power in relevant antitrust mar-
kets, and not solely over a particular patented product. One of
the most significant questions in determining the relevant
market is, "What are the potential substitutes?" Traditionally,
legal antitrust analysis has focused exclusively on product and
geographic market definitions. One important aspect of the
market is time; which is often considered in potential compe-
tition theory. Is there a separate technology or innovation
market for certain pharmaceutical products? Potential competi-
tion theory has been recently "resurrected" to deal with the
issue of technology.2' Broadly, potential competition theory
was formerly used to challenge mergers or acquisitions where
the acquiror might have entered the market independently (so
that the acquisition removed the future benefits of new entry),
or that the perceived new entry by the acquiror may have
disciplined the behavior of those already in the market. The
FTC began to rely on the doctrine once again in the early nine-
ties, after it had laid largely dormant during the Reagan-
19. U.S. Dep't of Just. and the Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (Apr. 6, 1995), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/publictguidelines/ipguide.htm.
20. Id. at 2.
21. See Mark Whitener, Potential Competition Theory - Forgotten But Not
Gone, 5 ANTITRUST 17 (1991).
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era.2 Since then, the doctrine has shed its antique name, and
re-emerged as the modern-sounding theory of "innovation mar-
kets."' It is likely that this theory has broader application
where dynamic rather than static market concerns are pre-
eminent.
Many of the cases in which the potential competition theo-
ry resurfaced were mergers involveing pharmaceutical compa-
nies. For example, in Roche's acquisition of Genentech, the
FTC alleged that the acquisition would lessen competition in
the research, development, production and marketing of three
broad product areas (Vitamin C, Human Growth Hormone and
treatments for HGH deficiency, and CD4-based AIDS/HIV
therapeutics).' The FTC order clearly evidences the FTC's
consideration of the effect on research and development spend-
ing in those distinct product markets if the merger were al-
lowed to proceed. Thus, innovation market theory was devel-
oped. However, in a market where there are significant barri-
ers to entry, the likelihood of potential competitors being fore-
closed by exclusive agreements or by unilateral action by a
monopolist is much less than in markets where barriers to
entry are low. It, therefore, would be arguable that innovation
market theory should be less important in the area of pharma-
ceutical innovation, because of the significant barriers to entry
for new drug development.
III. PATENTS, INNOVATION AND GROWTH
There exists an important relationship between a strong
patent regime and Research and Development (R&D). R&D
plays an important role in the world economy. The amount
spent on R&D in the developed world slightly exceeds 2% of
GDPY The United States spends an even greater percentage
of its GDP on R&D, 2.8%, or approximately $167 billion.26
This is to be expected given the U.S. preeminence in advanced
research in the world. Not surprisingly, R&D is particularly
important in the pharmaceutical sector. Firms in the pharma-
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. See File No. 901-0072, proposed consent order, 55 Fed. Reg. 38,153 (1990),
final order accepted, 55 Fed. Reg. 53,191 (1990).
25. See Braga, supra note 11, at 24.
26. See id.
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ceutical industry typically invest, at the very least, 10% of
their sales into R&D. In the United States, this percentage is
even higher and is estimated to be between 16% and 20.8% of
revenue.2 This makes the cost of research for the discovery of
a single drug exceptionally high. Drug research in particular is
risky, time-consuming and expensive. Only five out of every
4,000 chemical compounds that pharmaceutical research dis-
covers demonstrate a level of effectiveness sufficient to warrant
trial testing on humans.21 In all, only one of 4,000 new chemi-
cal compounds discovered in the laboratory is ever market-
ed.29 A recent study estimated the cost of a single new drug to
be $500 million."0 Therefore, the need for patent protection in
the pharmaceutical industry is significantly higher than in
other industries spending far less on such costs. A 1994 study
by Grabowski and Vernon found that only 30% of drug prod-
ucts introduced from 1980 to 1984 generated returns higher
than their average after-tax R&D costs.3' Their work revealed
that the 20% of products with the highest revenues generated
70% of returns during this time period.32 Another study found
that 55% of industry profits came from just 10% of drugs.3 As
one study notes, "Patent protection of pharmaceutical and
chemical products and processes is critical to justify high R&D
expenditure in these sectors." 4 Thus, given the high costs and
risks associated with drug research, companies must rely on a
27. See Pharmaceutical Industry Profile (Phrma), at http://www.phrma.org/
publications/industry/pro-file00/chap8nf.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2000). See also
Julio Nogues, Patents and Pharmaceutical Drugs: Understanding the Pressures on
Developing Countries, 502 WORLD BANK WPS PAPER 18 (Sept. 1990).
28. See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An
Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 295, 302-03
(1994).
29. See id. at 303.
30. See Boston Consulting Group, Sustaining Innovation, in U.S.
PHARMACEUTICALS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND THE ROLE OF PAT-
ENTS (1996). An earlier study by the Office of Technology Assessment estimated
that cost of a new drug was $359 million in pretax 1990 dollars for drugs that
first entered human testing in the period 1970-1982, when drugs were less com-
plex than they are today. See Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks, Rewards, Office
of Technology Assessment (Feb. 1993).
31. H. Grabowski & J. Vernon, Returns to R&D on New Drug Introductions in
the 1980s, 13 J. HEALTH ECON. 238 (1994).
32. Id.
33. F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharma-
ceutical Industry, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 86, 97 (1993).
34. See SIEBECK, supra note 2, at 103.
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limited number of highly successful products to finance their
continuing R&D.35
Copycat pharmaceutical companies threaten the future
ability of innovative pharmaceutical firms to undertake R&D
for new drugs. If companies can easily copy the products of
drug research, the economic incentive to conduct new drug
research is greatly diminished. One study suggests that 65% of
medicines would not have been commercially introduced or
developed if patent protection was not available; a much high-
er percentage than in other industries." The implication is
clear. Without strong patent protection in developing countries,
we risk making future research into life saving drugs financial-
ly unattractive. The loss of a possible AIDS vaccine or drug
that would ameliorate the effects of malaria seems unconscio-
nable. Yet, this very possibility results from making drug re-
search unviable due to overly high costs that cannot be re-
couped without sufficient patent protection.37
35. See Grabowski & Vernon, supra note 31. Earlier studies show how the
pharmaceutical industry is particularly dependent on the protection of patent
rights. See also C.T. TAYLOR & ZJ.A SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM (Cambridge University Press 1973); F.M. Scherer, The Economic
Effect of Compulsory Patent Licensing, in FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, (NYU Press
1977); Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, MGMT. SCI.
173-81 (Feb. 1986); R. C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial
R&D, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987). See generally M. Baily,
Research and Development Costs and Returns: The U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, 6
J. POL. ECON. 232 (Feb. 1972). Baily was among the first to show the relationship
that the profit of pharmaceutical companies was linked to the number of patents
issued to it because of the correlation between the returns on profits based on the
patented drugs.
36. See Mansfield, supra note 35. Mansfield used a random sample of 100
firms from 12 industries in the United States, and reports that 65% of the inno-
vations generated by pharmaceutical firms from 1981 to 1983 would not have been
marketed, and 60% would not have been developed, if patent protection had not
been available. The corresponding figures for companies in the next two highest
industries were considerably lower. In the chemical industry 30% of the innova-
tions would not have been marketed and 38% would not have been developed. The
petroleum industry ranked a distant third with 18% and 25%, respectively.
37. A Mc~Insey study on the pharmaceutical industry in India notes that
multinational corporations limited their involvement in the Indian drug market
after the adoption of the weak patent system in 1970. Some stopped selling drugs
that were priced too low, while many multinationals limited the portfolio of prod-
ucts they sold in India to only patent expired products. See Rajesh Garg et al.,
Four Opportunities in India's Pharmaceutical Market, 4 MCKINSEY Q. 132 (1996).
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IV. A STRONG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME LEADS TO
GREATER PROSPERITY.
Linkage between intellectual property protection to eco-
nomic growth has been longstanding, at least in the developed
world. Robert Solow's seminal work over forty years ago on the
relationship between technology to growth demonstrated that
87.5% of the growth of American economic output between
1904 and 1949 was related to technological factors.38 Other
studies also have shown the strong correlation that the injec-
tion of new technology into the economy produces, and the
resulting significant expansion of public wealth and social
welfare that it achieves. Charles Jones argues that in the peri-
od between 1965 and 1990, over 40% of U.S. growth can be
attributed to the rise in research intensity. 9 A strong intellec-
tual property system allows for the growth of new technologies.
Industrial studies suggest evidence that the social returns to
R&D exceed private returns, i.e., that countries benefit more
from R&D undertaken than the-companies that pursue the
R&D.40
Though less research exists in the impact of R&D in the
developing world, Edwin Mansfield's work illustrates that the
intellectual property protection afforded by a country directly
relates to the amount of technical development and transfer
into the developing country.4' This factor significantly influ-
ences the composition of Foreign Direct Investment ("FDI").
Countries with strong intellectual property protection tend to
experience a continuing flow of new high technology firms
entering the industrial base. One World Bank study concludes
that patent protection is an important ingredient in any pack-
age to support domestic R&D.42 The higher the intellectual
38. Robert Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, 39
REv. ECON. & STAT. 312 (1957).
39. Charles Jones, Sources of U.S. Growth in a World of Ideas, STAN. FAc.
WORKSHOP PAPER (Sept. 1999).
40. See SIEBECK, supra note 2, at 56.
41. Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, and Technology Transfer, INT'L FIN. CORP. OF THE WORLD BANK GROUP
DISCUSSION PAPER 19 (1994) [hereinafter Mansfield, Foreign Direct Investment];
Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Direct Investment, and Technolo-
gy Transfer: Germany, Japan and the United States, INT'L FIN. CORP. OF THE
WORLD BANK GROUP DISCUSSION PAPER 27 (1995).
42. See SIEBECK, supra note 2, at 103.
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property protection the greater amount of investment. This in-
vestment in technology has important secondary effects on the
economy of a developing country. Because of the competition,
older firms adapt to the new technology. As more FDI pene-
trates the economy, the benefits permeate to human capital
investment since workers need to be trained in the new tech-
nologies. As the amount of high technology investment grows -
once the development reaches a certain threshold level - re-
maining in the country to pursue high technology work, rather
than moving to the United States or Europe, becomes an op-
tion for developing highly educated workers. Once there are
more high skilled workers that remain in a developing country
as a result of stronger intellectual property laws, private capi-
tal investment, such as venture capital, increases because of
the increased investment opportunities. This in turn creates
more employment opportunities as more technology businesses
are developed, thereby creating a net social economic gain for
the developing country.
Another area in which developing countries benefit from
the impact of greater patent protection is FDI in technology.
Significant FDI occurs in countries with stronger patent re-
gimes since a legal regime that protects intellectual property is
one of the factors that foreign investors use in order to decide
where to place their investments. FDI is an important way for
knowledge to be diffused from one country to another as a
multinational firm will externalize proprietary knowledge with
its local partners. Even in the case of wholly owned local sub-
sidiaries of multinationals, knowledge is still transferred be-
cause local employees are hired by and receive training from
the multinationals. The relationships of these subsidiaries also
produce an externalization of knowledge with the local firms
with which it has business relationships.43 Evidence shows
that U.S. firms that invest in foreign production in developing
countries are more R&D intensive than similar U.S. firms that
invest in developed countries."
Surveys have found the strength of the intellectual proper-
43. See F. Stewart, Technology Transfer for Development, in SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY: LESSONS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY (R.E. Evenson & G. Ranis eds.,
Westview 1990); R.E. Lipsey et al., R&D by Multinational Firms and Host Country
Exports, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: LESSONS FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY (1990).
44. See Stewart, supra note 43.
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ty rights regime of a country to be of particular importance to
firms making R&D decisions regarding investment in the man-
ufacturing stage of development, and in licensing of technology
to unrelated firms.45 It follows that the stronger the intellec-
tual property regime, the stronger the patent protection will be
(and the greater the FDI will be). This is particularly true in
the case of the pharmaceutical industry sensitive to patent
protection. In an examination of the Indian pharmaceutical
market, Lanjouw argues that there may be economic reasons
why an intellectual property regime matters in decisions re-
garding the location of an R&D facility in a country." This
may have spillover effects of R&D into neighboring firms. Just
as important, a country's level of intellectual property protec-
tion may be used as a signaling mechanism for investors indi-
cating the general business climate in a particular country:
Where the stronger the intellectual property regime, the more
favorable the general business climate. The effect of trade
barriers on technology transfers is linked to FDI when based
on the level of intellectual property rights. Parente and
Prescott argue that the extent of barriers to trade play a key
role in per capita income across countries since trade may
affect growth by lowering the barriers to technology adop-
tion." Therefore, as free trade increases, so too will the im-
pact of FDI on increasing per capita income. These findings are
supported by Gould and Gruben's work in which they deter-
mine the importance of patent protection is a key determinant
of economic growth. Moreover, they note that there is a stron-
ger effect from a robust patent system in open economies than
in closed economies." Augmenting this point is a recent study
45. See Mansfield, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 41. The study bases
evidence on surveys of American, Japanese and German multinational corporations
suggests that intellectual property protection affects FDI decisions. See also Kamal
Saggi, Trade Foreign Investment, and International Technology Transfer: A Survey,
in MICROFOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION (1999).
46. Lanjouw, supra note 13, at 7.
47. Stephen L. Parente & Edward C. Prescott, Barriers to Technology Adoption
and Development, 102 J. POL. ECON. 298 (1994).
48. David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property
Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV. ECON. 323 (1996). An open economy also
has significant general benefits. Developing countries' open economies grew on
average at 4.5% per year in the 1970s-80s while those with closed economies grew
by only .07%. See Jeffrey Sachs & Andrew M. Warner, Economic Reform and the
Process of Global Integration, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIVITY, No. 1 (1995).
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that suggests that weak patent protection is itself a barrier to
trade.49
Increased patent rights stimulate investors and businesses
inside and outside of a country to undertake activity beneficial
to the country.0 Because patents protect innovation, even
smaller developing countries can benefit from a strong patent
regime since such a regime will help to establish a pro-inven-
tion culture in the domestic industry of such a country.' A
study of developing countries on the higher end of the develop-
ment spectrum, such as the Philippines, Argentina and Tur-
key, suggests that such countries must protect intellectual
property in order to encourage the rapid development of long-
term innovative abilities.5 2 In the thirteen years since the
publication of the study, the countries in the surveyed group
that have seen the greatest technological innovation are the
very ones that created strong patent systems; for example,
Mexico and South Korea."3
In contrast with a strong patent system, a weak patent
system, or one that fails to protect patents at all, will have a
chilling effect on local scientific and technological capabilities.
Scientists and engineers may abandon their home countries in
search of stronger intellectual property systems so as to pursue
their innovations in more hospitable settings. There is no in-
centive to innovate in countries where innovators cannot pro-
tect their work product from copycats. Copycat companies keep
these countries from developing a robust technology related
sector in their country. One author notes that highly educated
graduates in developing countries often do not have technologi-
cally sophisticated businesses, universities or other research
institutes in which to continue innovative high technology
49. See E.J. Smith, Are Weak Patent Rights a Barrier to U.S. Exports?, Dep't
of Econ., U. of Del., (unpublished mimeo 1997) (cited in Barfield, supra note 15, at
219).
50. See Robert M. Sherwood, Intellectual Property Systems and Investment
Stimulation: The Ratings of Systems in Eighteen Developing Countries, 37 IDEA
261, 275 (1997).
51. See id. at 276.
52. See J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property
Protection: An Empirical Investigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209, 217 (1987).
53. The volume of applications following the adoption of Mexico's strong pat-
ent regime was a 46% increase and steady increases thereafter. See Robert M.
Sherwood, The TRIPS Agreement: Implications For Developing Countries, 37 IDEA
491, 526-27 (1997).
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work that one can more easily find in the developed world.'
Establishing such institutions is costly." Perhaps a quicker
means to establishing such institutions is to attract high tech-
nology firms to a developing country. Since the only way that a
high technology company will share its technology with a de-
veloping country is if a strong intellectual property (and par-
ticularly patent) system is in place, this will affect the business
decision to transfer technology to the country. 6 Moreover, a
weak patent system has a chilling effect on the return of tech-
nologically skilled nationals who have studied or worked
abroad in the developed world.5 7 Information from India sug-
gests that despite the fact that about 2-3% of the world total of
scientific papers originate in India, the number of scientists
engaged in industrial research there is low and did not in-
crease between 1977 and 1982 - a period when industrial re-
search was expanding globally.58
Another benefit of heightened patent protection is the
incentive it provides to public-private partnerships in universi-
ty-based research. Private companies tend only to invest the
sums needed to spur research in universities when they can
gain the exclusive rights to the research. This insight has been
borne out in practice in the United States.59 By 1992, some
$3-$5 billion of US GDP originated from university licensed
products. Canada, Europe and Japan also have shown that a
more robust patent system increases the number of technology
transfers from universities to private companies that exploit
the research to the benefit of national economies.6 In con-
trast, too often in developing countries, potentially useful re-
search contributes only to the university library and not to the
economy of the country.6' The key to facilitating this type of
technology transfer is, again, a robust patent protection sys-
tem.
54. See Edmund W. Kitch, Policy Consideration: The Patent Policy of Develop-
ing Countries, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN. L.J. 166, 173-75 (1994).
55. See id.
56. See id. at 175.
57. See Frame, supra note 52, at 224.
58. See UNESCO, 1986 Statistical Yearbook at V-37 (1986).
59. See Sherwood, supra note 53, at 509.
60. See id.
61. See id.
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V. CREATION OF VENTURE CAPITAL OPPORTUNITIES
Venture capital is an area that is encouraged by a strong
patent regime. Venture capital is financing that comes from
firms that invest in young and rapidly growing companies.
Venture capitalism is particularly important as a source of
funding for start-up companies.6 2 In the United States, pri-
vate equity funds, which include firms specializing in venture
capital, have expanded from $50 billion in 1980, to roughly
$200 billion in 1999. Private equity has also increased tremen-
dously in Europe where the size of funds raised has increased
by 40% or more annually over the last few years.63 In the
United States, venture capital alone accounted for $46.55 bil-
lion of private equity in 1999, up from $3.94 billion in 1993. 4
In the developing world, the amount of venture capital
available is smaller. In part, this is a result of a weak intellec-
tual property system. A strong intellectual property system is
crucial to the success of venture capital and encourages the
creation of venture capital investment in fledgling technology
industries. Venture capital fills a void that larger institutions
cannot fill, as it serves as an intermediary between investors
searching for high returns and entrepreneurs seeking funding.
Consequently, venture capitalists require a higher return than
other investments because of the more risky nature of the
endeavor. Venture capitalists therefore structure their deals to
minimize risk and maximize returns." Private funds only will
seek out new technologies and innovations if the risk of that
creation being copied is very low. Otherwise, the risk on a
return will be too great to make the venture viable given that
many enterprises can list their innovation as their only signifi-
cant asset. If the innovation cannot be protected, there is little
62. In the first quarter of 2000, 85.2 percent of all venture capital invest-
ments went to companies in the early or expansion stage. This is in contrast to
64.8 percent in the first quarter just a year ago. See National Venture Capital
Association, Venture Capital Investments Increase 266% to 22.7 Billion in Q1 2000,
at http'J/www.nvca.org/Vepress/5_04_OO.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2000).
63. See Venture Capital and Private Equity, Venture Capital and Private
Equity Statistics, at http'//www.entrepreneurship.hbs.edu/VCPE.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2000).
64. See National Venture Capital Association Web site, at
http://www.nvca.org(VepressO3.27_00.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000).
65. See, e.g., Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., (Nov.
1, 1998) at 132-133.
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chance that a venture capital firm would incur the risk of
investment since the collateral for the investment could be
easily copied, and thereby rendered worthless. The theory is
born out in figures from countries that have stronger intellec-
tual property regimes. For example, there are roughly 5,500
venture companies in South Korea and 174 venture capital
funds have invested capital of 1.18 trillion won ($1.53 bil-
lion).66
VI. THE CASE FOR A STRONG PATENT REGIME IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
Developing countries have traditionally argued in favor of
a weak patent regime.' Previously, one could explain the lev-
el of patent protection in relation to the economic development
of a country. The greater the level of economic development,
the higher the protection a country afforded to its patent re-
gime." However, since the early 1980s this traditional under-
standing has not held up as patent protection in the aggregate
has increased worldwide, even with regard to developing coun-
tries.69 Moreover, the TRIPS agreement, when put into effect,
will raise the level of patent protection in many developing
countries." Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that since
the 1980s intellectual property rights have grown with regards
to a country's output in international transactions of goods and
services. Between 1980 and 1994, the amount of knowledge
intensive or high technology products as a percentage of the
trade in goods worldwide has doubled from 12% to 24%.71 As
patent rights increase the range of traded goods through inno-
vation, this may stimulate the development of technological
capabilities in developing countries.72 One recent study finds
66. See Samuel Len, Seoul to Set Up Venture Support Center in U.S., KOREA
HERALD (Mar. 20, 2000).
67. See Braga, supra note 11, at 19.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. One area of concern is that developing countries will see the TRIPS
Agreement as an upper limit to patent protection rather than as a minimum
threshold. Since the TRIPS Agreement is a compromise agreement, a country must
create stronger patent protection than merely under TRIPS to maximize the effect
of a strong patent system.
71. See Braga, supra note 11, at 28.
72. See. id. at 44.
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that the impact of patent protection enhances growth the more
open a country is to trade."3 Therefore, developing countries
removing their trade barriers and creating stronger patent
regimes generate greater economic growth.
Some developing countries have argued that strong patent
regimes only have helped developed countries because foreign
companies displace domestic producers of pharmaceuticals. The
evidence does not seem to support this position. In 1978, Italy
adopted a system of full patent protection, replacing a system
without any patent protection. A study undertaken ten years
later revealed that local manufacturers actually increased their
market share by 5%.7 One factor that changed in Italy, how-
ever, was the size of the surviving local firms. Thirty percent of
the companies that existed in 1978 had disappeared by 1988.
Interestingly, while employment in the rest of the industry de-
clined, employment within the pharmaceutical sector rose by
2.7%. This increase could be traced to the significant growth
within R&D during this period equaling 22.8% of revenue, an
almost 20% growth annually in real terms." This data sug-
gests a strong correlation that the new robust patent regime
played a vital role in the growth of the pharmaceutical sector.
Further, anecdotal evidence from South Korea and Mexico
supports the conclusion that stronger patent systems lead to
greater local R&D and greater growth within the pharmaceuti-
cal sector. 6 In Mexico, U.S. R&D into the Mexican pharma-
ceutical market has doubled since the adoption of a strong
Mexican patent law.77
One recent study by Lanjouw and Cockburn sheds light on
some of the empirical issues in this debate. 8 They suggest
that more important than legal change itself, is whether or not
73. See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, International Transaction in
Intellectual Property and Developing Countries, J. INT'L TECH. MGMT. (forthcoming
1999).
74. See G. Jori, The Impact of Pharmaceutical Patents - The Italian Experi-
ence, (1988) (cited in Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas
(FIEL), in PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE CASE OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY IN ARGENTINA 62 (Buenos Aires: FIEL 1990).
75. See id.
76. See Sherwood, supra note 50, at 357-358; Sherwood, supra note 53, at
497. See also PHRMA Web site, at http'//www.phrma.org/publications/industry/
profileO0/chap8.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2000).
77. Sherwood, supra note 53.
78. See Lanjouw, supra note 13.
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firms believe that legal changes will be implemented and how
effective the new system will be.7" In this way, some interna-
tional investment into countries with low patent rights can be
explained as a belief by firms that these countries were serious
about the future enforcement of laws they were in the process
of enacting. They offer India as an example of where patent
applications doubled in 1995; the year before the TRIPS
Agreement was signed, strengthening protections there."0
VII. INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE DEVELOPING
WORLD
Local capital seems even more dependent than foreign
capital on a strong intellectual property system because of the
greater mobility of foreign capital to invest in projects that
have a higher return and less risk. As one study notes, local
capital has fewer options than its foreign counterpart espe-
cially in areas where R&D is necessary for originating its prod-
ucts or services; either through local R&D or through the ac-
quisition of foreign R&D."' Certain types of diseases are less
profitable for drug manufacturers to research because they
affect either a smaller group of people or the group cannot
afford the drug even if it were to go on the market. Many of
such drugs would combat tropical diseases which
disproportionately affect the developing world.
These diseases could be treated by so-called orphan
drugs,82 but only if there is an incentive to innovate and de-
velop these drugs. In the United States, the incentives for
companies to develop these drugs were increased by passage of
the Orphan Drug Act. 3 Before 1983, there were only ten
drugs for rare diseases approved by the U.S. FDA. In the de-
cade after passage of the Orphan Drug Act, 99 drugs were
approved, and 189 were reported to be under clinical testing.'
The Orphan Drug Act allowed seven years of market exclusivi-
79. Id. at 7.
80. Id. at 9.
81. See Sherwood, supra note 50.
82. See The Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. 97-414 (1983).
83. See id.
84. See Jean 0. Lanjouw, The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents
in India: 'Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering?" 6366 NAT'L. BUREAU
OF ECON. RES. WORKING PAPER 6366 (1998).
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ty for drugs where the target population was fewer than two
hundred thousand patients.' Perhaps the most well known
drug that would not have been developed for market but for
the Orphan Drug Act is the anti-AIDS treatment AZT.8"
If drug manufacturers have no economic incentive to work
on the R&D of tropical disease remedies, then it is the poor of
the developing world who will suffer. The weak intellectual
property regime that creates disincentives for R&D further
creates an important negative externality upon world
health." Lanjouw notes that the strengthening of intellectual
property rights appeared to be stimulating domestic R&D in
countries that previously had weak protections." Lanjouw
demonstrates the belief that TRIPS would be taken seriously
led firms to take greater interest in tropical disease re-
search.89 This was a departure from previous firm practice of
doing very little research into tropical diseases because, in
India for example, the weak patent system would not have
allowed firms to recoup the cost of their investments." As the
study concludes in the case of malaria research, "[i]t is hard to
avoid the conclusion that the historical absence of IPRs played
an important role in retarding the development for this impor-
tant disease."9
In the past, many in developing countries have argued
that a weak patent regime was necessary to create and in-
crease the size of domestic pharmaceutical firms." This policy
may have worked in some countries such as Argentina and In-
dia.93 In Brazil, the absence of controls was not in itself suffi-
cient to boost the market share of Brazilian pharmaceutical
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See Keith E. Maskus, Regulatory Standards in the WTO: Comparing Intel-
lectual Property Rights with Competition Policy, Environmental Protection and Core
Labor Standards, 00-1 INST. FOR INTL. ECON. WORKING PAPER 5 (2000).
88. Lanjouw, supra note 13, at 20.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 29
92. See F. Grynszpan, Case Studies in Brazilian Intellectual Property Rights,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (F.W. Rushing & C.G. Brown eds.,
Westview Press, 1990); C. R. Frischtak, The Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights and Industrial Technology Development in Brazil, WORLD BANK INDUSTRY
SERIES PAPER 13 (1989).
93. See Frischtak, supra note 92, at 13.
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companies. 4 Even if in general this is true, there are two
important responses. First, the growth of domestic industries
did not necessarily help consumers, which will be addressed
later in the paper. 5 Second, even if it helped infant industries
in the past, these domestic industries are strong enough to
compete in the world today and many do so by exporting
abroad. India and Argentina provide examples. At their cur-
rent stage of development, in the long-term, both companies
and their home countries in the developing world will be hurt
by programs that protect these industries since they retard
high technology growth in the home country. If anything, intel-
lectual property rights should be seen as a tool for develop-
ment in countries because of the increase in the technology
base from funding, local research and the introduction of tech-
nology that produces economic growth.96 Copying the work of
others makes it more difficult for firms to innovate on their
own since they too will merely copy the work of others. This
means they are generally not first movers in science and tech-
nology. Should technology become more difficult to copy as it
gets more complex, it would further set back the domestic
industry from the world leaders. Jeffrey Sachs notes, "In the
poorest countries, it is possible to have economic growth with-
out much innovation because they can borrow or import tech-
nology. However in a country like Argentina, that has a high
level of revenues, progress really requires a much larger com-
munity of innovation."97 In countries where innovation could
lead to great results because of an educated workforce, a lack
of patent protection is therefore particularly damaging.
VIII. DRUG PRICES UNDER A PATENT PROTECTION REGIME
Drug prices will not necessarily increase if countries shift
to a patent enforcing system." New patents only will apply to
new products unless pipeline protection is available; not to
those that already exist. Hence, there will be no effect on price
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Ratio-
nales and Reality, 33 IDEA 349, 360 (1993).
97. Margalit Edelman, Treading on Toes in US-Argentine Trade Tango, 21 J.
ECON. COM. 419 (June 29, 1999).
98. See Sherwood, supra note 53, at 498.
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and any future effect on new products will take some time to
percolate through to the market. A number of critics of a
strong patent regime argue that prices will increase if patent
rights are recognized. This is not necessarily true. In Italy,
price increases were lower than the general increase in prices
after the patent regime was strengthened. 9 Additionally, pric-
es eventually go down after the patent expires. Numerous
studies conclude that generic competition after the expiration
of a patent brings prices of a drug close to its marginal produc-
tion cost."°0 The market thereby makes the pricing more com-
petitive as competition from other pharmaceutical companies
forces the original holder of the patent to reduce price or ac-
cept a loss of market share.' Another common argument is
that the price of drugs will rise because of the displacement of
copycat firms from the market because of patent protection.
The displacement of copycat firms does not lead to a net social
loss. A study by MacLaughlin, Richard and Kenny notes, "[the]
transfer of sales or royalty payments to other nationals would
represent merely a transfer of income from one member of
society to another and therefore, from the nation's perspective,
would represent no net loss at all."' 2 Likewise, much is made
by critics of patent protection regarding the payment of royal-
ties for patented products that copycat companies had previ-
ously utilized without such payment. Yet, a developing country
that purchases technology is not disadvantaged by the pur-
chase. Over the long term, it will result in gain due to the
incentive to build up its own imitative R&D capacity for when
the drug patent expires."0 3 The payment for patented technol-
ogy has an offset that can prove to be advantageous. Japan
saw its high technology sector increase as the flow of new tech-
nologies stimulated domestic technological growth.' 4
99. See Jori, supra note 74, at 62.
100. See Nogues, supra note 27. See also TAYLOR & SILBERSTON, supra note 35;
H. Grabowski & J. Vernon, Longer Patents for Lower Imitation Barriers: The 1984
Drug Act, 2 AM. ECON. REV. 76, 195-198 (1986) (examining the U.S. drug market).
101. See Nogues, supra note 27.
102. See J.H. MacLaughlin et al., The Economic Significance of Piracy, in IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? (R.M.
Gadbaw & T.J. Richards eds., Westview Press 1988).
103. See SIEBECK, supra note 2, at 56.
104. See Guntram Rahn, The Role of Industrial Property in Economic Develop-
ment: The Japanese Experience, Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, 14 INT'L REV. OF IND. PROP. AND COPY-
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At the consumer level, the introduction of strong patent
protection will not have a large effect on consumer welfare. If
the new rate of product innovation is stable over time, the
introduction of new patented drugs will be matched by those
going off patent. While Lanjouw's study on the Indian market
was inconclusive as to whether introducing a stronger patent
regime would speed up or slow down the availability of drugs
to Indian customers, Lanjouw notes that if the domestic mar-
ket is already competitive, as in India, then the ability of the
drug innovator to extract higher prices from consumers is lim-
ited."5 The availability of other drug therapies that are off
patent also reduce the price of drugs under a strong patent
system because firms will compete in price for sales; thereby
reducing price to a level slightly above that of marginal
cost. 6 By the end of 1996, only eight of the drugs on the
World Health Organization's 7th Model List of Essential Drugs
were still under patent in Europe. 7 This suggests that
switching to lower priced alternative drugs is an available
option for all but 10% of drugs on the WHO list. 8 The avail-
ability of therapeutic substitutes serves to restrain prices and
limit the amount of welfare loss that consumers would suffer.
Another reason that patent protection will not affect the
welfare of most consumers is a sad but true fact. Many people
are priced out of drugs once the price of drugs reaches a cer-
tain level. It does not matter if the cost of a drug is $100 or
$180 a year if the average salary in a particular country is
$560 a year. Both drugs are equally unaffordable. As Lanjouw
notes, "for the 70% or so of the population who currently do not
have access to pharmaceuticals, the introduction of patent
protection, and any price effects that may follow are
irrelevant."0 9
Weak patent regimes, on the other hand, encourage anti-
competitive and exclusionary behavior that permits the abuse
of monopoly power in defending home markets or in penetrat-
ing foreign markets. This manifests itself in a number of differ-
RIGHT L. 449-92 (1983).
105. Lanjouw, supra note 84, at 9.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id. at 10.
109. See id. at 30.
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ent ways: export cartels, predatory dumping in the export of
copied drugs, and collusive agreements among firms to divide
markets in the internal sale and distribution of copied
drugs." ° Such firms may behave in an oligopolistic manner
in which each copycat firm is assigned a particular part of the
domestic market. The firms could then enforce their pricing
scheme through the threat of disciplining a member of the
oligopoly through predatory pricing that would attempt to
increase its market share."'
IX. Do COPYCATS COMPETE?
An important element of overall drug pricing is the extent
to which copycat industry is competitive. Copycats frequently
collude to fix prices and engage in other forms of anti-competi-
tive conduct which leads to higher, and not lower, prices. In-
deed the evidence from Argentina, where the average imitation
product is actually more expensive than the patented product,
strongly suggests price-fixing or other anti-competitive behav-
ior by copycat firms.' Why else would the products be more
expensive? If there is a lack of competition in the market for
copied products as evidence suggests, then weakening the
patent system will serve only to enrich the copycats at the
expense of local consumers (who do not see material price
reduction), the patentees (whose potential R&D investment is
significantly diminished), and global welfare generally, mea-
sured by fewer new drugs being developed.
The off-patent market where generics are still 30 - 40%
less than branded drugs is interesting for comparison purpos-
es."1 The reason could be a perception of higher quality
among branded products. This price difference cannot be ex-
plained by the patent system.
R&D costs are not, though they should be, calculated by
many critics into the price of drugs since the R&D costs make
110. See Maskus, supra note 87, at 5. See also Sherwood, supra note 53, at
500 (noting that copycat drug companies have been known to fix prices among
themselves).
111. On the destructive potential of oligopolies, see George Stigler, A Theory of
Oligopoly, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 39 (George J. Stigler, ed., 1968).
112. See Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceutical Patents: An
Unreasonable Solution to an Unfortunate Problem, 34 JURmIETRICS J. 295 (1994).
113. See id.
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up a significant portion of the price that pharmaceutical firms
charge for products. As a result, those scholars that have noted
lower costs in some countries that have low patent protection
have flawed analyses since they never factor into consideration
the lost drugs that companies do not produce because of the
increased development costs from copying."4 The overall loss
in terms of the increased cost of R&D and the loss to compa-
nies in revenue because of copying explains how the extra cost
of R&D makes some drugs untenable. When this is factored
into the cost of the purchase of a copied drug, the cost of of
that drug rises. The cost of the copied drug also fails to take
into consideration the cost of non-tariff barrier and higher
distribution costs that affect only imported, legitimate drugs.
X. THE ROLE OF DISTRIBUTION LAWS IN INFLATING PROFIT
MARGINS
Many countries maintain distribution laws which are un-
competitive and provide large protection for local distributors
at the expense of foreign suppliers (but not local suppliers).
These laws, known as dealer protection laws, are leftovers
from days of import substitution and usually provide for very
high termination indemnities which must be paid by foreign
suppliers upon terminating local distributors. Such indemnities
do not arise for purely local relationships. Hence, these laws
certainly violate GATS article XVII, and arguably also GATT
article III.4 (the GATT provisions on non-discrimination be-
tween foreign and local entities)."5 The result is that, for
products which are distributed by foreign suppliers, distribu-
tors can, without fear of recourse, extract very high profit mar-
gins from local suppliers. In some cases these can be as much
as 80%. Clearly this represents a substantial part, if not all
the difference between foreign pharmaceuticals prices for pat-
114. See, e.g., Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange Trips: The Pharmaceutical In-
dustry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining
WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 1069 (1996); A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form
of Economic Imperialism," 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1996).
115. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments - Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round, vol. 31:33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), art. 17 [hereinafter GATS
Agreement]. See also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, art. 3, para. 4 [hereinafter GATT Agreement].
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ented products and those of copycats in some markets.
At present, in the Latin American and Caribbean region
alone, these laws apply in the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica,
Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Haiti, and to a lesser ex-
tent, in Brazil and Colombia.
XI. COMPULSORY LICENSING: CONVERGENCE OR CLASH BE-
TWEEN ANTITRUST AND PATENT PROTECTION
A compulsory license arrangement is one in which a gov-
ernment mandates that a patent holder release her patented
right to a government institution or licensee in return for a set
fee. Put differently, "[a] compulsory license is an involuntary
contract between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller im-
posed and enforced by the state.""6 Compulsory licensing is a
particularly damaging way that some countries use to weaken
patent rights; even if patent rights are recognized in that coun-
try. Developing countries fear that without compulsory licenses
they will not get the drugs needed by their populations. They
also believe the licenses prevent overpricing of drugs by multi-
nationals. Yet, compulsory licensing serves to make the patent
right less secure because it allows for the free-riding of other
companies that, after the expensive R&D is completed by the
innovative firm, can apply for a license to sell the drug and
make considerable profit from doing so."' As Robert
Sherwood explains, "A compulsory licensing system is a policy
contradiction. In effect, the state, having bestowed an exclusive
property right for an innovation in order to serve the public
good, then exercises its discretion to reduce the value of that
right through compelled sharing of the property right under
defined circumstances, also to serve a public good."" 8 In fact,
compulsory licenses do not necessarily lead to significantly
lower prices in developing countries. Copied products through
compulsory licenses often sell at high prices even though the
R&D costs are minimal."9 Prices, therefore, should be even
116. P. Gorecki, Regulating the Price of Prescription Drugs in Canada: Compul-
sory Licensing, Product Selection, and Governmental Reimbursement Programs,
(Economic Council of Canada, 1981) cited in Julian-Arnold, supra note 96, at 349.
117. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 96, at 357
118. See Sherwood, supra note 50, at 276-77.
119. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 96, at 364. See also Juan Aznarez, Los
medicamentos nacionales, mds caros, LA NACION (Argentina), (May 28, 1999) (offer-
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lower than they tend to be in the developing world.
As a result, a high social rate of return is sacrificed in
favor of a high private rate of return to the few beneficiaries of
compulsory licenses. 2 ' Since compulsory licensing weakens
the patent right, it diminishes foreign investment into a
country's economy. This, in turn, limits the opportunity for in-
creased growth. 2' Canada, for example, repealed significant
portions of its compulsory licensing statute because of the near
demise of the Canadian R&D based pharmaceutical indus-
try.22 Compulsory licensing is anti-competitive because it en-
courages free-riding, thereby increasing societal economic cost.
Further, it destroys the "prospect function" of a patent right,
as analogized earlier in this article,2 ' because the patent
owner loses the ability to control who uses the patent.24
Third parties can find ways of increasing the value of the pat-
ent and then force the owner to license the patent at a regulat-
ed rate. There are also serious questions as to who regulates
the rate for a compulsory license and what basis the regulator
uses for doing so. It is very difficult to measure the putative
future value of a given patent and a government may do a poor
job in estimating such value.
In the developing world, compulsory licenses have been
identified as a way to increase competition and reduce prices
for poor consumers. Manot Tshabalala-Msimang, South African
Minister of Health, stated that he believes compulsory licens-
ing to be a crucial tool to make HIV/AIDS drugs more widely
available. 2 ' Many non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
have also stated that compulsory licensing holds the key to the
world's health problems. 2 ' Many of those that support com-
ing evidence that copied products in Argentina sell at a higher price than even
the products of the multinational pharmaceutical firms that have patented the
product elsewhere).
120. See Julian-Arnold, supra note 96, at 362.
121. See id. at 363.
122. See U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Pub. No. 332-302, Global Competitiveness of
U.S. Advanced Technology Manufacturing Industries: Pharmaceuticals 3-15 (1991)
(cited in Fisch, supra note 28, at 315).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Press release from Medecins Sans Frontieres Web site, at http'/
www.msf.org/advocacy/accessmed/reports/2000/06/pr-pfizer.htm (last visited Oct. 14,
2000).
126. See Joelle Tanguy, Treating AIDS, N.Y. TIMES at A24.
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pulsory licensing do so based on the possibility of greater ac-
cess to generic products. Joelle Tanguy, Executive Director of
the NGO Doctors Without Borders, has advocated that long-
term strategies, such as "generic production," be undertaken to
make medicines affordable to the developing world.12 In fact,
Tanguy does not mean generic production as it is commonly
known-production of drugs by companies after the patent
right has expired." Rather, Tanguy, and many NGOs
conflate the practice of producing generics, which involves re-
specting a system of patent rights and rewarding innovation on
the one hand, with the use of copied drugs through a system of
compulsory licensing and parallel trading that weakens the
ability of firms to innovate on the other hand. This misguided
conflation becomes more apparent in the HIV/AIDS Pricing
Report that Doctors Without Borders produced in connection
with the 13th International AIDS Conference in July 2000.129
In its report, Doctors Without Borders explicitly states that
compulsory licensing and parallel trading are ways to mitigate
the "negative consequences" of patent rights. 3 '
A review of recent publications by Doctors Without Bor-
ders sheds light on why the group, as representative of a num-
ber of NGOs, takes this view. In one document, the group
states, "Millions of poor people die every year from infectious
diseases because medicines that could cure them are too expen-
sive. For other diseases there is no treatment: no effective
medicine exists and nobody is looking for a cure."'' Surpris-
ingly, the group never asks why it is that pharmaceutical com-
panies do not research diseases for which there are no effective
treatments. In order for companies to do so, there needs to be
an economic incentive to pay for the process of innovation. As
noted earlier, this innovation can only occur in countries which
protect the patent right. The fact that anti-malarial medica-
tions in India are only now being developed is due to the fact
that the developing world did not respect patent rights and
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See C. PEREZ-CASAS ET AL., HIV/AIDS MEDICINES PRICING REPORT, SET-
TING OBJECTIVES: Is THERE A POLITICAL WILL (2000).
130. Id.
131. Doctors Without Borders, 1999 Activities Report, at http://wlw.msf.org/
publications/activ rep/1999/access.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2000).
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thereby removed the incentives to create such a drug.'32 In
an attempt to lower prices for drugs through a weak patent
system, developing countries actually served to increase the
price for new drug development to a level that made R&D into
these drugs economically unfeasible. Doctors Without Borders
therefore seriously underestimates the disincentivising effect
that a compulsory licensing and parallel trading system would
have on the world's ability to come up with new treatments for
diseases, and by doing so undermines the position of its own
constituency.
Another problem that Doctors Without Borders notes in its
publications is the prohibitive cost of medicines in developing
countries that spend as much as half of their total health bud-
gets on medicines. 33 The answer here lies not so much in the
hands of innovative companies, but rather in the use of pro-
curement methods which can dramatically reduce the cost of
healthcare on a nation's budget. This means that many coun-
tries need to create better programs in which procurement
problems can be mitigated through mass purchases of medi-
cines through transparent agencies. As one World Bank report
notes, "Experience has demonstrated that when procurement is
executed well... significant savings are possible-resulting in
the maximization of pharmaceutical budgets."'34 These sav-
ings can be significant and immediate. For example, Nicaragua
spent $21 million of its health budget, 17% of the total health
budget, on pharmaceutical procurement.'35 Nicaragua estab-
lished a transparent procurement agency and accompanied the
creation of this agency with the implementation of an essential
drug list."6 Within one year, the pharmaceutical budget
shrank to $13 million.13 7
132. See Lanjouw, supra note 13, at 29.
133. Doctors Without Borders, 1999 Activities Report, at http/lwww.msf.org/
publications/activrep/1999/access.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2000).
134. Jillian Clare Cohen, The LAC Pharmaceutical Sector (2000), at
http://www.worldbank.org.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id. A more in depth study of the type of policies that will reduce
costs through better administration and procurement can be found in Jillian Claire
Cohen, Public Policies in the Pharmaceutical Sector: A Case Study of Brazil, World
Bank, LCSHD PAPER 54, (Jan. 2000).
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XII. THE DEMISE OF COMPULSORY LICENSING AS AN ANTITRUST
REMEDY
Proponents of strong compulsory licensing statutes argue
that they are a solution to the problem of patent exclusivity be-
cause they are a remedy that is sometimes used in patent
cases under U.S. law. In order for compulsory licensing to be a
remedy, there must be some right that is violated; it is in anti-
trust cases that these remedies are most often fashioned. The
basis of antitrust jurisprudence is to distinguish between law-
ful and unlawful acquisition and maintenance of monopoly
power in order to promote greater competition, yield an effi-
cient allocation of resources, and benefit consumers. 8' When
a patented product represents one of many products that com-
pete in the market, few antitrust problems will arise. In the
case where a patented product is so successful that it either
evolves into its own market or engulfs a large percentage of
the preexisting market, there is potential for tension between
the antitrust and patent law.'39 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court has found that, "Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our
patent system .. . ."40 The types of cases in which compul-
sory licenses have been granted are a small group in which
the, "intellectual property has been wrongfully acquired or
pooled and cross-licensed with competitors and only if one of
these acts is accompanied by other predatory conduct.""" As
a major treatise on antitrust notes, compulsory licensing may
be used as a remedy for certain antitrust violations involving
138. See Wynne S. Carvill & Douglas D. Leeds, Antitrust Issues in Management
of Intellectual Property, 483 PLI/Pat 59.
139. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981); East-
man Kodak v. Image Tech. Srvs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
140. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
141. James B. Koback, Jr., Antitrust Treatment of Refusals to License Intellectu-
al Property, 566 PLI/Pat 517, 533. As the Court stated in Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 (1992), "The Court has held
many times that power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as
a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if 'a seller ex-
ploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire into the next'."
(citing Times-Picayune Publ'g Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 611 (1953)). It is impor-
tant to note that on its own, dominating a market is not punishable. In fact, it is
rewarded. See U.S. v. Grinell Corp. 384 US 563, 570 (1966) (noting that it is not
unlawful for a competitor to become a monopolist by virtue of a superior product,
business acumen or historical accident).
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patents, but "it must be used sparingly."'42
Even where there has been an antitrust violation, compul-
sory licensing is not favored as a remedy because any advan-
tages are outweighed by administrative difficulties. The courts
would have to supervise it and there is no way of determining
what a "reasonable" royalty rate would be. The royalty rate
will depend on the value of the patent, but value is almost
impossible to determine until the product has been in the mar-
ket for some time. 43 In the United States, compulsory licens-
ing has not been adopted as a statutory requirement but is
part of the relief which petitioners may receive if there has
been a demonstrated patent misuse or antitrust violation.
Nevertheless, in the United States there are very few cases
where the use of compulsory licensing as a remedy resulted
from the non-use of a patent.' Importantly, compulsory li-
censing as a remedy for non-use is inapplicable to the pharma-
ceutical sector in which companies would want to bring new
drugs to market to earn back the high cost of R&D.
XIII. COMPULSORY LICENSING AND THE PATENT MISUSE
DocTRINE
Arguments that support compulsory licensing are also
sometimes based on some variant of the patent misuse doc-
trine. The U.S. Federal Circuit has construed the patent mis-
use precedent narrowly.'45 As a general rule, the patent mis-
use doctrine has a broader scope than that of antitrust laws;
though there is a large amount of overlap between the two as
long as antitrust concerns such as market structure, intent and
anticompetitive effect can be met.4 ' "All that a successful de-
fense of patent misuse means is that a court of equity will not
lend its support to enforcement of a mis-user's patent."47 The
patent misuse doctrine is a court made doctrine that is intend-
142. AREEDA AND HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRuST LAW, Vol. III, §705 (Rev. 1996).
143. See id. Vol. III, §704.
144. See Jack Kaufinann, Symposium: Antitrust and the Suppression of Technol-
ogy in the United States and Europe: Is There a Remedy?, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 527,
529 (1998).
145. See Patricia A Martone et al., The Patent Misuse Defense - Does it Still
have Vitality?, 566 PLI/Pat 547, 552 (1999).
146. See Wynne S. Carvill & Douglas D. Leeds, Antitrust Issues in Management
of Intellectual Property, 483 PLI/Pat 59, 89 (1997).
147. Senga-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
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ed to prevent a patent holder from extending the power of the
patent beyond the grant defined by the patent statute.148 The
doctrine is most frequently raised as a defense in infringement
suits and breach of contract actions to pay royalties.149 If a
patent holder is found guilty under the misuse doctrine, the
patent is rendered unenforceable until the patent holder reme-
dies the misuse. 5' However, patent misuse may limit the va-
lidity of a patent for behavior that does not rise to the level of
an antitrust violation. With the exception of non-economic
reasons why the doctrine should apply (e.g fraud on the patent
office), this represents a serious flaw in the doctrine itself.
The lack of enforceability of a patent has the same de facto
effect as a compulsory license. The patent misuse doctrine
differs from antitrust violations. The U.S. Supreme Court has
noted that a patentee's act may constitute patent misuse with-
out rising to the level of an antitrust violation.51
The patent misuse doctrine applies the "clean hands" equi-
table doctrine as a vehicle for enforcing good faith require-
ments.'52 Unclean hands alone will not render a patent right
unenforceable; as the unclean conduct must have a relation to
the patent in question.5 ' Yet, the doctrine has been applied
to cases in which the patent holder has attempted to "tie" the
sale of goods not covered by the patent."M The test the Feder-
al Circuit uses in its patent misuse jurisprudence examines
whether, "the patentee has impermissibly broadened the 'phys-
ical or temporal scope' of the patent with anti-competitive
effect."55 A patent holder's behavior can be a misuse on its
face in the case of per se antitrust violations such as a tie-in
(in which the purchase of two products are tied together) or
price fixing. 5' The rule of reason serves as the basis for judg-
ing the legality of a potential anti-competitive effect. In
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., the Federal Circuit held
148. See Carvill & Leeds, supra note 146, at 88.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969).
152. See Martone, supra note 145, at 554.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 555.
155. Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
156. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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that, "where an anticompetitive effect is asserted, the rule of
reason under 35 USCA § 154 is the basis of determining the
legality of the provision."157 If, under the rule of reason, there
has been a violation, then the misuse doctrine will apply. The
patent misuse doctrine seems ill equipped as a remedy in the
pharmaceutical setting. The patent right makes it possible for
pharmaceutical firms to get out products, which they are
incentivized to do. Others are equally incentivized to come up
with therapeutic alternatives if a large market exists for the
drug. If there were per se violations, then the patent misuse
doctrine as well as antitrust legislation would apply. However,
these types of per se violations are not common in the drug
industry. Problems in the pharmaceutical industry are those of
pricing - a result of copycats. 58 It is not a patent misuse
problem. It is a problem of the use of patented property with-
out the right to do so.
XIV. How MUST A PATENTEE TREAT RiVALS?
The patentee's obligation with respect to how it treats
rivals is a significant issue, and one that is becoming more
serious for patentees every day. Many reports quoted else-
where in this article have suggested that patentees might be
deemed to have some kind of obligation to deal with others.
The apparent basis for this suggestion is public concern with
the monopoly nature of the patent right. There appears to be a
view that, since the patent confers a monopoly on the patentee,
then one has to be very concerned about the behavior of the
monopolist. Furthermore, on occasion, it may be appropriate to
use government intervention to force a monopolist to license
his products. However, this characterisation is deeply mislead-
ing. Firstly, patentees are not necessarily monopolists. Wheth-
er they are or not depends on the range of substitutable prod-
ucts available to treat a particular disease. Secondly, even if
the patentee is a monopolist, forcing the patentee to license his
product may not necessarily lead to positive results for con-
sumers for reasons detailed below. However, requiring a firm
with market power to deal with rivals could have significant
deterrent effects on innovation, and could lead to a decline in
157. Id. at 706.
158. See discussion, infra Section IX.
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overall research and development spent by innovators. Some
have also sought to use the patent misuse doctrine to discipline
the patentees decision to license or not license his patented
product.
The U.S experience is instructive here also. In the United
States, refusal to licence is not a basis for the patent misuse
doctrine. 5 9 According to the Xerox litigation, it will not be
grounds for any kind of antitrust violation either if the paten-
tee is merely exercising his right under the patent. Monopo-
lists may not refuse to deal in certain circumstances, because
they have market power and their actions may lead to foreclo-
sure of the market to competitors. The key question for phar-
maceutical patent holders is whether they have market power
in a relevant antitrust market. This question will turn on the
availability of substitutes. Generally, a monopolist cannot
change its pattern of dealing, or may be precluded from refus-
ing to deal, if it controls an "essential facility," or it uses its
monopoly power in one market to attempt to gain a monopoly
in the second ("monopoly leveraging doctrine"). 6 ' There is a
defense for the refusal to deal only if the monopolist has a le-
gitimate business reason for the refusal to deal.'6 '
XV. COMPULSORY LICENSING AS A REMEDY FOR REFUSALS To
DEAL
Compulsory licensing has had changing fortune in United
States litigation, principally as a remedy for antitrust viola-
tions, such as refusal to deal. However, recent U.S. learning in
this area is very important. The increasing protection of patent
rights in the U.S. in recent history has done much to boost
innovation, and provides a model for other countries intent on
building economic growth.
The compulsory licensing doctrine has not been significant-
ly relied upon in the U.S. It has only substantively been ap-
plied where intellectual property has been wrongfully acquired
or pooled and cross-licensed with competitors, and only if one
of these acts is accompanied by some predatory conduct.'
159. See Patent Reform Act, 1988 $271(d); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust
Litig., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (hereinafter Xerox litigation).
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See S. Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T Co., 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir.
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The use has been more typically limited to consent decrees in
merger cases. There is now a rebuttable presumption that a
monopolist's desire to exclude others from its protected work is
a preemptively valid legal business justification for any imme-
diate harm to consumers.16 Originally a copyright test, this
has now been extended to patents also." In the Image Tech-
nical case, the court held this presumption could be rebutted
by evidence of pretext.'65 The Xerox litigation makes it clear
that the courts will not inquire into the subjective motivation
for exercising statutory rights granted under the patent laws,
"even though [the] refusal to sell or license [a] patented inven-
tion may have an anti-competitive effect, so long as the anti-
competitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory
patent grant."166
XVI. RECENT FTC ENFORCEMENT ACTION
In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,'67 the district court
imposed significant obligations on Intel by imposing an affir-
mative duty to continue to deal with a competitor. The court so
held even though Intel was effectively being asked to reveal its
trade secrets to one of its rivals.' 6 The decision caused some
consternation among antitrust practitioners. Intergraph was a
manufacturer of graphical interface workstations, and had
acquired the Clipper computer technology but abandoned it in
favor of a relationship with Intel. Integraph threatened to sue
Intel for patent violations relating to its chip technology. In re-
sponse, Intel demanded that it enter into a cross license agree-
ment."'69 When Intergraph refused, Intel allegedly retaliated
by denying access to chips and technical product development
information which it had previously furnished to
Intergraph.70 The district enjoined Intel from refusing to
1984).
163. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st
Cir. 1994).
164. See Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195
(9th Cir. 1997).
165. Id.
166. Xerox Litigation, supra note 159.
167. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
168. Id. at 1289.
169. Id. at 1267.
170. Id. at 1267-8.
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deal with Intergraph.' The Federal Circuit, however, reject-
ed the district court's assertion that Intel's microprocessor
technology was an essential facility, with respect to which Intel
had "affirmative duties to refrain from acting in a manner that
unreasonably harms competition."" 2 Indeed, the Federal Cir-
cuit was careful to make sure that the essential facility doc-
trine was confined to competition with the controller of the
essential facility, and not to competition in derivative markets.
The Federal Circuit stated that:
[the] courts have well understood that the essential facility
theory is not an invitation to demand access to the property
or privileges of another, on pain of antitrust penalties and
compulsion; thus the courts have required anti-competitive
action by a monopolist that is intended to 'eliminate competi-
tion in the downstream market'. 73
XVII. THE EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO DEAL:
ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE
The seminal definition of the essential facilities doctrine
can be found in MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel.
and Tel. Co., in which the Court held "A monopolist's refusal to
deal under these circumstances is governed by the so-called
essential facilities doctrine. Such a refusal may be unlawful
because a monopolist's control of an essential facility (some-
times called a 'bottleneck') can extend monopoly power from
one stage of production to another, and from one market into
another. Thus, the antitrust laws have imposed on firms con-
trolling an essential facility the obligation to make the facility
available on non-discriminatory terms."74 Under MCI, four
elements must be met to establish liability under the essential
facilities doctrine: (1) control of the essential facility by a mo-
nopolist; (2) a competitor's inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility; (3) the denial of the use of the
facility to a competitor; and (4) the feasibility of providing the
171. Id. at 1259.
172. Id. at 1277.
173. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1358 (9th Cir. 1999).
174. MCI Communications Corp. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132
(7th Cir. 1983).
[Vol. =XV:2400
2000] COMPETITION POLICY & INNOVATION 401
facility.'75 In the pharmaceutical setting, the patented drug
itself does not create a bottleneck. Indeed it could be regarded
as the opposite of a bottleneck since new innovations can be
derived as a result of the patented product. To the extent that
there are bottlenecks in the pharmaceutical sector in the devel-
oping world, they are distribution bottlenecks. Solving these
bottleneck problems would only lower prices because it would
reduce vertical monopolistic restraints on price imposed by a
number of the copycat producers.
XVIII. COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER TRIPS
The TRIPS Agreement allows for compulsory licensing
under Articles 27(1), 31 and 65(4), but limits these circum-
stances to cases of antitrust violation, national emergency, and
public noncommercial use.76 The damaging effect of compul-
sory licenses was recognized by the WTO, and hence, where
WTO Members insist on maintaining such provisions, the
WTO rules strictly regulate what can be used as a basis for
compulsory licensing. Indeed, laws can be TRIPS compliant
with no provision for compulsory licensing at all. TRIPS Article
31 states that, "Where the law of a Member allows for [com-
pulsory licensing] ... the following provisions shall be respect-
ed."77 In other words, even if Members have compulsory li-
censing provisions, they must respect certain basic provi-
sions."'
Article 31 of TRIPS lists, conjunctively, the criteria which
must be met before a compulsory licensing regime is deemed to
be TRIPS compliant. These include:
a) each case must be considered on its merits;
b) the grant is conditional on the purported licencee having
attempted to obtain authorization by the patentee on com-
mercial terms, and failure to achieve it in a reasonable period
of time;
175. Id. at 1132-33.
176. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [here-
inafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
177. Id. art. 31.
178. See id. art. 31(a)-(1).
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c) the use of compulsory licensing is limited to the purpose
for which it was initially authorised;
d) the license may not be exclusive;
e) the license cannot be assigned;
f) that license should be predominantly (note earlier drafts
stated "solely" or "exclusively" for domestic market use;
g) compulsory licensing is allowed only during the time that
the circumstances which gave rise to the license still prevail,
and provided that a competent authority has the power to
review the continuation of the license;
h) requires proper compensation to the patent holder;
i) provides that the procedure in deciding compensation;
j) provides that the decision itself must be subject to higher
judicial review; and
k) enables countries to bypass (b) through (h) in cases of
anti-competitive actions by patentees."
Although much has been made of the fact that Article 31
of TRIPS is ambiguous, this should not cloud those aspects of
the article which are clear and unambiguous. Compulsory
licensing is subject to very strict conditions, which must all
apply (except in cases of anti-competitive conduct by the paten-
tee). The references to a reason behind the need for the license
grant, and the fact that the license only will be granted while
that reason prevails, is strongly suggestive that the compulsory
licensing regime should be used as a remedy for some form of
market failure only, and, therefore, should not be universally
applicable. The foregoing addresses what constitutes anti-com-
petitive behavior, and what might further constitute patent
misuse. However, many countries' submissions to the WTO
trade and competition group help to further clarify this issue.
Applying TRIPS, anti-competitive practices must be strict-
ly construed. Article 40 of TRIPS gives a clue as to what
179. Id. art. 31.
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should be considered anti-competitive for these purposes."'
Article 40 provides that some licensing practices "may have
adverse effects on trade and may impede the transfer and
dissemination of technology."181 Article 40(2) gives examples
of how abuses of intellectual property rights which might have
an adverse effect on the market can be corrected.182
In its submission to the WTO Trade and Competition
group, the European Union offers useful examples of what may
or may not constitute anti-competitive practices, possibly justi-
fying the imposition of a compulsory license:
"The core rationale for their [IPR] protection is that they tend
to create a dynamic efficiency that is pro-competitive and out-
weighs any short term allocative efficiency gains that might
exist in the absence of such protection. . . .. " The EU
notes that the exclusive right given to the patentee will, in
and of itself, not give rise to an abuse of market power. This
depends on the availability and market share of substitutable
products. The practices that might give grounds for anti-com-
petitive abuse of a monopoly right are:
1. If competitors grant licenses to each other for the purpos-
es of dividing up markets, then there may be a market divi-
sion problem. But transfers in and of themselves do not pres-
ent a problem. Competition problems only arise if the trans-
fer is the subject, the means, or the consequence, of an anti-
competitive arrangement.
2. The patentee may not try and impose a fixed margin on
licensees. If he does so, that may constitute a competitive
problem.
3. The exclusive right conferred by the patent is not in and
of itself sufficient to determine the existence of a dominant
position. The price of goods is not necessarily an abuse of
dominant position. Indeed the EU submission states that
"only in exceptional circumstances,
180. Id. art. 40.
181. Id.
182. Id. art. 40, para. 2.
183. See EU Submission on the Relationship Between the Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy, and between Investment and
Competition Policy, WTIWGTCPIW/99 (Sept. 15, 1998).
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should abnormally high prices be considered as an abuse in
themselves.""'
4. A refusal to grant a license, even for a reasonable royalty,
does not in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
Additional requirements are required, such as where the
patentee is not working the patent itself, withholding impor-
tant technical information from the public against the
public's interests, engaging in unfair sales prices, or engaging
in discriminatory sales practices (e.g. unfairly refusing to
supply certain parts of the market)."
All of these points are directed towards practices by paten-
tees which tend to impede trade and prevent the invention
being fully exploited in the domestic market. Many of the U.S.
cases also illustrate the type of anti-competitive practices,
which are outside the limited antitrust immunity that the pat-
ent itself provides. In Twin Labs, Inc v. Weider Health & Fit-
ness,186 the Second Circuit relied on the authority of the lead-
ing antitrust treatise, stating that "facilities that are natural
monopoly, facilities whose duplication is forbidden by law, and
perhaps those that are publicly subsidized and thus could not
practicably be built privately."187 It is clear from the case law
and commentary that patent owners risk compulsory licensing
of their property only if they are a monopolist for a particular
treatment, have some intent to foreclose competitors from that
particular treatment, or are otherwise engaging in anti-com-
petitive activity. Generally, the patent right itself will be a le-
gitimate business justification for refusing to licence a patent
in the absence of other anti-competitive factors as set out
above. As if further clarification was necessary, the IP Guide-
lines state that the agencies will not require a patent owner to
create competition in its own technology.
The FTC Action against Intel considered the issue of an
patent holder's duty to license to customers who were not di-
rect competitors with Intel (the OEMs).1" The FTC's case al-
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Twin Labs, Inc. v. Weider Health & Fitness, 900 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1990).
187. See Areeda and Hovencamp, ANTITRUST LAW, s736.2 (Supp. 1988).
188. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 99-1323, 2000 U.S. App.,
Lexis 9987.
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leged Intel's practices stifled competition in micro-processor
related technology."' 9 But even in this case, the consent order
permits Intel to restrict use of its advanced technical informa-
tion to the production of computer systems that incorporate the
microprocessor to which the information applies, not to the
creation of rival microprocessors. 9 ' Bill Baer, former director
of the FTC's Bureau of Competition said:
A ... concern some have expressed is that the Commission's
action seeks to force compulsory licensing of Intel's patents to
its competitors. Even a cursory reading of the Commission's
complaint and proposed order shows that suggestion to be
seriously misleading . .. Where however, Intel had a legiti-
mate business reason - such as evidence of misuse or misap-
propriation of its inventions, the company would be free to
protect its rights.' 9'
By analogy, where pharmaceutical patent holders know
that their property is being misused or misappropriated, as in
the case of copycats, there is simply no antitrust issue in their
refusal to license, and no antitrust remedy (such as compulsory
licensing) is appropriate. Any other approach could lead to
serious economic erosion of the very fabric of the patent right
itself.
In the words of one commentator, "allowing competition
policy to trump property rights is, in all but the most egregious
of situations, an extraordinary result."'92 The essential facili-
ty doctrine applies more in the area of regulated utilities, such
as the MCI case itself.9 ' It is a departure to try to apply
such a doctrine to the ordinary business of patent holders
where such considerations do not apply. The Xerox litigation
and the Intergraph case seem to finally put out of court the
suggestion that patent property ever can be subject to the es-
sential facility doctrine. Indeed, the freedom to license or not
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Baer, Antitrust Enforcement and High Technology Markets, Remarks before
the American Bar Association Sections of Business Law, Litigation, and Tort and
Insurance Practice, San Francisco, California (Nov. 12, 1998).
192. Robert P. Taylor, Intellectual Property As "Essential Facility," Address at
the American Bar Association Practicing Law Institute Seminar on Intellectual
Property and Antitrust, San Francisco, California (July 20-21, 2000).
193. 708 F.2d 1081, at 1132.
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license is one of those integral bundle of rights conferred by
the patent system itself.194
XIX. THE EFFECT OF COMPULSORY LICENSING ON
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES
Compulsory licensing could have dramatic effects on phar-
maceutical companies. The compulsory license will lead to a
reduction of price for patented products. That loss will have to
be somehow absorbed by pharmaceutical companies. There are
various possibilities:
1. Raising revenue by increasing other products' price. This
cannot occur where drugs are sold in a competitive environ-
ment and may be capped by countries which have price con-
trols. In other words, prices of the non-compulsory licensed
patented drugs would likely increase in more competitive,
non-price controlled markets, such as the United States,
which would be politically unpalatable.
2. Reduction of expenditure. The major expense that pharma-
ceutical companies incur is the cost of research and devel-
opment. Other expenses include advertising and returns on
investment. If returns on investment are lowered, share price
could decline, and might lead to further consolidation in the
industry. Lowering advertising revenues would have little
impact on the losses that would result from compulsory li-
censing. The most significant reductions would have to come
from R&D budgets. Companies might elect to engage in lower
risk activity, such as generic production. In any event, a
lower R&D budget will lead to fewer new pharmaceutical
products being developed.
3. Reduce costs by merging with rivals. Pharmaceutical com-
panies may be faced with no other alternative but to merge
with rivals in order to reduce costs. The result of this could
be an overall reduction in innovation as competition in inno-
vation is reduced and the incentive to invest substantially in
research and development declines.
194. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
[Vol. XXVI:2406
20001 COMPETITION POLICY & INNOVATION
XX. PARALLEL TRADING
Parallel trading in the pharmaceutical setting occurs when
a product in one market is exported to another country. Paral-
lel traders seek to take advantage of the arbitrage possibilities
available in the pricing of drugs due to different economic and
regulatory practices between countries.'95 The practice has
attracted international attention because of the perception that
use of parallel importation regimes results in cheaper drugs
prices in the developing world.
Although empirical evidence on the implications of parallel
trading are scant, a number of theoretical works 'show the
negative implications of a parallel trading system.'96 Parallel
trading undermines the patent right and therefore creates an
economic loss to both innovators and consumers; thereby creat-
ing an anti-competitive practice. Barfield and Groombridge
note four types of market settings in which parallel trade has
particularly pernicious effects to the pharmaceutical indus-
try."'97 Such settings include:
1. where parallel imports would inhibit the ability of phar-
maceutical firms to recoup R&D and other fixed costs and
chill further innovation;
2. where price discrimination would enhance welfare by
facilitating entry of pharmaceutical firms into new, low-
priced markets and thus expanding output;
3. where government created monopolies creates price distor-
tions and drives price down below marginal cost of the pro-
duction of a pharmaceutical product; and
4. where parallel imports could freeze out authorized distrib-
utors through lower prices.19
195. See Barfield, supra note 15, at 185.
196. See id. See also National Economic Research Associates, The Economic
Consequences of the Choice of Regime of Exhaustion in the Area of Trademarks,
(Feb. 8, 1999).
197. Barfield, supra note 15, at 187.
198. Id.
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To extract the lowest possible price for pharmaceutical
products consumers need a strong competition policy that en-
courages trade liberalization, protection against monopolization
power, and the encouragement of FDI, rather than a system of
parallel trading. This strong competition policy will let the
market determine a pareto-enhancing allocation of resources in
the economy. It also will create proper regulatory supervision
to prevent monopolization or exploitation of market power,
since businessmen have an incentive to pursue anti-competi-
tive behavior. This will prevent any abuse of the patent right.
In contrast to the appeals made on behalf of parallel trad-
ing, the economics of such trading does not significantly help
consumers. Burstall and Senior note, "Doctors and patients
may not profit from parallel trade but the distributors - the
wholesalers, the dispensers in the high street or in hospitals,
and, of course, the traders themselves - very definitely do."'99
Likewise, the National Economic Research Associates found
similarly that, "the major beneficiaries of parallel trade are the
parallel traders who, on average, claim about 70 percent of the
price difference between a parallel import product and the
local price. Other direct beneficiaries are pharmacists and, to a
much lesser extent, payors. The consumer hardly benefits at
all.""' Such studies prove that parallel trading serves to ben-
efit a few private individuals at the expense of society at large.
It raises R&D costs and makes financially infeasible R&D into
some necessary drugs.
Advocates of parallel trading often claim that parallel
trading is in reality no different than the doctrine of interna-
tional exhaustion of rights. Exhaustion occurs when a patent
holder, or other intellectual property rights holder, has sold a
product and can thereafter not prevent its authorized entry
into a different market. The patent holder cannot prohibit the
subsequent resale of the product because their rights to a par-
ticular item have been exhausted by the act of selling it. Such
a definition requires a particular geographic area. For exam-
ple, once a product enters the U.S. market it is exhausted
199. Burstall & Senior M.L., Burstall and I.S.T. Senior, Undermining Innova-
tion: Parallel Trade in Prescription Medicines 22 (1992), cited in Barfield and
Groomfield, supra note 15, at 250.
200. National Economic Research Associates (NERA), Survey of Parallel Trade,
25 (May 1997), cited in Barfield, supra note 15, at 250.
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anywhere within the U.S. market.2°' This is quite different
from international exhaustion of rights, which is what parallel
traders seek. A study by the National Economic Research Asso-
ciation on the consequences of an international exhaustion
regime on trademarks in Europe extends this theory to other
intellectual property rights, such as patents.0 2 It notes that
an international exhaustion of rights doctrine would have
significant negative economic consequences.203 The report ar-
gues against an international exhaustion of rights system
noting that pareto-efficient outcomes will occur when patent
holders are allowed the freedom to exploit their rights through
price discrimination in different national markets. 204 Exploi-
tation of the property right creates incentives to innovate and
develop new products. International exhaustion of rights disad-
vantages consumers by making patents less effective in pro-
tecting the consumer by maintaining quality through safety or
technical standards and identifying the origin of a product.
25
It also would make it difficult for the patent holder to control
the distribution chain and conditions under which products are
sold. 6 In the absence of a strong competition policy, an ex-
haustion doctrine and exclusive distributorship agreements
would have a detrimental effect on welfare, since domestic
brands may be part of a single de facto cartel that would con-
spire to keep prices high through the exclusive distributor
relationships-vertical arrangements between upstream and
downstream sellers. This type of vertical restraint was deemed
untenable in the United States sixty years ago.20 ' National
201. U.S. v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942) (noting, "[blut merely
because the licensee takes the final step in the manufacture of the patented prod-
uct, by doing work on the blank which he has purchased from the patentee's li-
censee, it does not follow that the patentee can control the price at which the
finished lens is sold.").
202. National Economic Research Associates, The Economic Consequences of the
Choice of Regime in the Area of Trademarks, (Feb. 8, 1999) Executive Summary at
3.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See National Economic Research Associates, The Economic Consequences of
the Choice of Regime in the Area of Trademarks, (Feb. 8, 1999) Executive Sum-
mary at 6-7. The problem of counterfeit and poor quality medicines that Doctors
Without Borders notes, is only exacerbated by parallel trading.
206. See id.
207. See Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. U.S., 309 U.S. 436 (1940).
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exhaustion, in contrast, is permissible since traders are given
the right to move goods within a national border, in the case of
the United States, or regional borders, in the case of the Euro-
pean Union. The situation of international exhaustion where
one country allows for parallel imports from another unrelated
country does not fit within this national exhaustion policy. The
only reason why the doctrine might have some vitality in Eu-
rope is because of the drive towards a single European market.
It has no application in free trade areas or among countries
where market conditions are significantly different. Moreover,
in Europe, the doctrine of exhaustion of rights is a bifurcated
one. Recognizing the drive to retain and develop Europe's sin-
gle market, exhaustion of rights applies to trademarks in Eu-
rope, but outside Europe the doctrine has no application."'
However, even in Europe there are significant problems with
the application of the doctrine in the case of pharmaceutical
products where price controls exist in some countries, but not
in others, and where pricing is not set in a uniform manner.
Some who believe in parallel trading and an international
exhaustion system argue that such a system favors free trade,
whereas systems that limit parallel trading reduce free trade
and are thereby anti-competitive. This reveals a certain con-
fusion. Followed to its logical conclusion, it would eliminate all
forms of intellectual property, because it fails to recognize that
the intellectual property right is not merely tolerated by com-
petition law, but encouraged.0 9 In addition, it also fails to
take into account that efficient pricing may depend on a cer-
tain level of international price discrimination as described
above. This is because the world is not yet a single, uniform
market and different prices have to be charged for different
products. If companies cannot rely on the integrity of their
pricing structures (because parallel traders are arbitraging the
price differences), this efficiency would be lost. Further, the
argument for parallel trading does not take into account the
fact that patents restrict market forces for a period of time in
order for the patent holder to recoup the cost of innovation.
This is based upon the assumption that the dynamic effects of
the patent right will produce greater societal economic welfare
208. See Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & Co v. Harlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Case C-355/96.
209. See Barfield, supra note 15, at 191-93.
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gains than would occur without the patent right. The exhaus-
tion doctrine is not so much a question of free trade as much
as it is one of which form of patent policy to pursue. As one
scholar notes, there are two serious problems with the exhaus-
tion as free trade argument rather than as one of patent poli-
cy. "First, the conditions surround parallel trade do not fit into
the assumptions on which standard static trade models sup-
porting the case for laissez-faire trade are built. Second, a
static analysis with regard to IPRs... would require the re-
moval of all rights to intellectual property."210
The economic reality is that price discrimination in the
setting of drug prices in different markets, through market
segmentation, can have significant positive effects for both
producers and consumers. Because of the possibility of arbi-
trage, parallel importation also has a disciplining effect on the
ability of companies to offer discounts for drugs in poorer
countries' markets. Any discounted drug simply would be the
subject of an arbitrage action by a parallel trader, which would
treat the drug like a discounted foreign currency. This would
lead to dampened innovation and less of a likelihood that com-
panies will lower price in less developed nations' markets.
Under Ramsey pricing, companies base pricing on how
much a particular consumer will be willing to pay for a partic-
ular good, above the marginal cost of producing such a good,
because of different price elasticities for pharmaceuticals.21
The ability to discriminate based on price is a common and
economically justified practice.212 Examples include offering
volume discounts or discounts to initial customers.213 Price
discrimination is permitted in the case of movie tickets, where
matinees and evenings shows are priced differently, as are
tickets for youth and senior citizens, or advanced purchases
over the phone, or prices for a large group.1 4 Price discrimi-
nation has ill effects when it is used to gain or enhance monop-
oly power. Without a differentiation of markets, pharmaceuti-
210. Id. at 193 (citing Carsten Fink, Does National Exhaustion of Intellectual
Property Contradict the Principle of Free Trade? 3-4, Draft Paper for Conference on
Exhaustion of Intellectual Property rights and Parallel Importation in World
Trade, Geneva, Switzerland (Nov. 6-7, 1998).).
211. See Barfield, supra note 15, at 224.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id.
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cal companies will not be able to recoup the cost of innovation
during the life of their patent right.
Another significant problem with allowing parallel trading
is that the arbitrage it offers is a significant incentive for trad-
ers to cartelize their operations, and even for patentees to
collude on price. This erosion of the incentive to charge a na-
tional market-based price will ultimately lead to problems in
efficient allocation or resources.
Within the borders of the United States price discrimina-
tion is permitted in some circumstances, although § 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act and § 2 of the Sherman Act prohibit
price discrimination in other circumstances.215 The standards
for each Act differ slightly. Price discrimination violates the
Robinson-Patman Act if it involves: (1) two sales to different
person; (2) in interstate commerce; of(3) goods that are of like
grade and quality; (3) at different prices; (4) where the effect of
the discrimination may be to lessen competition substantially
among the sellers of the product (primary-line injury), the
buyers of the product (secondary-line injury) or the customers
of the buyers (third-line injury).2" The prima facie case can
be rebutted with several defenses, such as meeting competition
or volume discount.217
The Sherman Act §2 offense of monopolization has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market, and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent.2" The essence of a §2 monopolization or attempted mo-
nopolization claim is that a single firm with market power has
engaged in conduct designed to exclude and foreclose competi-
tion in a relevant market. It may be the market in which the
party already has market power or the market into which it
would like to extend that market power.
215. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§13a, 13b, 21a; Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§1-6, 6a, 7.
216. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§13a, 13b, 21a.
217. See id.
218. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §2.
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XXI. TRIPS-BASED SOLUTIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES?
A modern patent law would allow for compulsory licensing
only in very specific cases, as specified in the TRIPS agree-
ment itself. The law would be focused on sound patent protec-
tion (including enforcement of patent rights) that would stimu-
late innovation in the country. Adherence to TRIPS should be
seen as a minimum requirement but should not be seen as the
maximum amount of patent protection. The law should give
patentees the right to discipline parallel traders by enforcing
their patent rights against them.
However, provisions also need to be made for procurement
of patented drugs. International financial institutions could
contribute to procurement programs based on competitive
bidding, not dissimilar to the programs which already exist in
the World Bank for the procurement of generic drugs.219 In
order to avail itself of such a program, the country concerned
would have to demonstrate TRIPS compliance and show that
compulsory licensing and parallel trading regimes were not
present in its law and that proper enforcement steps were
being taken against violators. For patented drugs, any bidder,
if not the actual patentee, would have to be licensed by them.
Given the key, and often understated role that distribution
difficulties play in these countries in ensuring that drugs are
delivered throughout the country, distribution issues also
should be a central element in the certification process. Indeed,
countries that maintain distribution laws of the type described
herein should not be eligible for these new procedures because
of the significant profit margins that local distributors could
charge and effectively block proper distribution of the drugs
once purchased.
XXII. CONCLUSION
Countries must create patent friendly regimes as part of a
larger legal and political infrastructure. As one recent book
notes, developing countries often fail to enforce already exist-
ing laws against violators of patent rights."' Often, enforce-
ment mechanisms are weak at best. Moreover, even if patent
219. See id.
220. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS (Clarisa Long
ed., AEI Press, 2000).
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protection exists, compulsory licensing systems, or a system of
parallel imports, undercut these laws.22" ' Therefore, a dynam-
ic and robust system of patent protection is needed. Without a
dynamic integrated legal framework and the associated en-
forcement, the gains made with the TRIPS agreement and cor-
responding domestic legislation could disappear as countries
attempt to circumvent their TRIPS obligations. This will lead
to a net global social loss. Equally important, reforms must be
geared toward maximizing the benefits from a robust intel-
lectual property system; not merely from creating the mini-
mum system possible to avoid WTO complaints.222
Such reforms include strengthened antitrust and competi-
tion laws, the addition of more staff in patent offices, greater
transparency from government and business, and a greater
will on the part of the developing world for better enforcement
of laws. This recognizes the fact that the objectives of competi-
tion policy and intellectual property policy are in fact the
same: to stimulate and encourage innovation. The key is inno-
vation, and its importance is summed up in a comment by two
FTC commentators:
An antitrust policy that reduced prices by 5 percent today at
the expense of reducing by 1 percent the annual rate at
which innovation lowers the costs of production would be a
calamity. In the long run a continuous rate of change, com-
pounded, swamps static losses.223
This remark recognizes the critical role of innovation in
our society and, consequently, the importance of securing dy-
namic efficiency over static efficiency. Hence, linked to in-
creased patent protection is the use of competition policy to
maximize the effect of the patent right system. As the U.S.
Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing of Intellectual Property
states, "the intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws
share the common purpose of promoting innovation and en-
hancing consumer welfare."224 A strong competition policy
221. See id.
222. See Braga, supra note 11, at 53. Sherwood notes the problem of creating a
well administered patent office in the developing world. See Robert M. Sherwood
et al., Promotion of Inventiveness in Developing Countries Through a More Ad-
vanced Patent Administration, 39 IDEA 473 (1997).
223. Willard K Tom & Joshua Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property;
From Separate Spheres to Unified Filed, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997).
224. U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE AND THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDE-
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would lower the cost of drugs in developing countries by ensur-
ing that distribution channels are more competitive. These are
often arcane and add substantially to the cost of drugs for con-
sumers.212 Many developing countries maintain laws that
give local distributors enormous amounts of protection when
they distribute the products of foreign suppliers. These laws
serve to make the distribution system itself uncompetitive and
increase price. Distributors can charge very high profit mar-
gins, sometimes close to 100%. Unless these laws are changed
it will remain difficult for pharmaceutical and other supplier
firms to make the most of their opportunities in different mar-
kets, thereby reducing prices for consumers. Without a change
in these anti-competitive distribution laws, it is difficult for
consumers in the developing world to see the real benefits that
import competition can bring in terms of reduced prices and
greater consumer choice.
If firms are to find cures for new diseases or those that
affect developing country populations, they must be
incentivised to engage in the necessary research. Without this
incentivisation, new drugs will not be developed. Without a
strong and enforced patent system, it is unlikely that the de-
veloping world's health problems will be solved, nor will the
new and complex diseases which afflict the world, such as
HIV/AIDS, be treated. Indeed, the kind of patent regime that
many activists crave is one which would freeze innovation, lead
to no new drugs being developed, and the world's health prob-
lems continuing to visit human suffering and misery on mil-
lions of people. The misguided belief that innovation will al-
ways be with us and does not need to be incentivised could
lead to needless tragedy at a time when new innovations and
genetic discoveries hold such rich promise for humanity.
LINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, April 6, 1995. On the simi-
larities between the two regimes, see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed Cir. 1990).
225. Latin American Pharmaceuticals, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Aug. 2 1999,
available at 1999 WL 10528970.
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